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III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 78-2a-3(2)(d) and 
rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
appellant's Motion for Continuance? The trial court's denial of 
homeowner's Motion for Continuance will not be upset absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990) . 
II. Did the trial court's statements to the defendant regarding 
Rule 11 and Rule 26(g) sanctions prevent a fair trial? The 
conduct and remarks of the trial judge will be grounds for a new 
trial only where it can be shown that such remarks and conduct 
prevented a fair trial. Bunnell v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 740 
P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). 
III. Did the trial court refuse to admit evidence offered by the 
defendant? This court will presume a judgment or ruling is valid 
and supported by the evidence where issues raised on appeal are 
not part of the trial record. Horton v. Gem State Mutual of 
Utah, 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990). 
IV. Were the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law regarding the termination of the contract proper? Findings 
of fact will be reversed only if clearly erroneous; conclusion of 
law will be reviewed for correctness. Kasco Services Corporation 
v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992). 
V. Do the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law accurately 
reflect the trial court's findings? 
VI. Should U.R.A.P. 33 sanctions be imposed on the appellant for 
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the bringing of his non-meritorious appeal issues? Party will be 
subject to sanction under Rule 33 (U.R.A.P.) where the court 
finds the appeal was filed in bad faith, was frivolous, or has no 
reasonable likelihood of success. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990) . 
VII. Should U.R.A.P. 40(a) sanctions be imposed on the appellant 
and his attorney for his failure to adhere to the rules of this 
Court? If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation 
of court rules, or is filed without reasonable inquiry into the 
law and the facts, sanctions are appropriate. U.R.A.P. 40(a). 
V. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES ANI) 
RULES 
The following rules are applicable to the issues on appeal: 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions. 
...The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, 
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or 
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. ...If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
Rule 26(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
5 
Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. 
... The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a 
certification that he has read the request, response, or 
objection and that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it 
is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; and (3)not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or 
expensive, given the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation. ...If a certification is made in violation 
of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the 
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, 
response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, 
including a reasonable attorney fee. 
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the 
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such 
postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the 
materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained and 
shall show that due diligence has been used to procure it. 
The court may also require the party seeking the continuance 
to state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he 
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon admits 
that such evidence would be given, and that it may be 
considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and 
excluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon 
that ground. 
Rule 4-502(5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration: 
All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery 
proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery 
proceedings shall be completed, including all responses 
thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with 
the court no later than thirty (30) days before the date set 
for trial of the case. The tight to conduct discovery with 
thirty (30) days before trial shall be within the discretion 
of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty 
(30) days before trial shall be presented to the judge 
assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in the 
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action. In exercising its discretion, the court shall take 
into consideration the necessity and reasons for such 
discovery, the diligence or lack of diligence of the parties 
seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discovery 
will prevent the case from going to trial on the scheduled 
date, or result in prejudice to any party. Nothing herein 
shall preclude or limit the voluntary exchange of 
information or discovery by stipulation of the parties at 
any time prior to the date set for trial, but in no even 
shall such exchanges or stipulations require a court to 
grant a continuance of the trial date. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on 
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is 
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding 
or conclusion. 
Rule 11(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made 
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the 
evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or 
if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a 
statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best 
available means, including recollection. The statement 
shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or 
proposed amendments within 10 days after service. The 
statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be 
submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval 
and, as settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk 
of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Correction or modification of the record. If any difference 
arises as to whether the record truly discloses what 
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be 
submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either 
party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is 
misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or 
the appellate court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be 
corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be 
certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the court 
if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the 
parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days 
after service, any party may serve objections to the 
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proposed changes. All other question as to the form and 
content of the record shall be presented to the appellate 
court. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
(a)Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, 
which may include single or double costs, as define din Rule 
34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the 
party or the party's attorney. 
(b)Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper. 
Rule 40(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and 
other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active 
member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The 
attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his 
or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State 
Bar number. A party who is not represented by and attorney 
shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper and state the 
party's address and telephone number. Except when other 
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, 
briefs, and other papers need not be verified or accompanied 
by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has 
read the motion, brief or other paper; that to the best of 
his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after 
reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for 
the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion, 
brief, or other papers not signed as required by this rule, 
it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the 
omission is called to the attention of the attorney or other 
party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of 
the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/appellee (Hereinafter "the designer") entered into a 
personal services contract with defendant/appellant (Hereinafter 
"the homeowner") to perform interior design work and consultation 
homeowners' Deer Valley home. The oral agreement between the 
parties was reduced to writing by the homeowner, and was prepared 
in its entirety by the homeowner. Homeowner agreed to pay the 
designer a total design fee in the amount of $8,000.00. That fee 
was to be paid in quarterly payments of $2,000.00 each over the 
course of one year. The term of the agreement began July 1, 1991 
and ended June 30, 1992. At the end of the term of the agreement 
homeowner had paid only $6,000.00 of the total amount due, and 
had also failed and refused to pay Utah State sales tax, in the 
amount of $1,925.00. The homeowner refused to pay the remaining 
amount and attempted to unilaterally terminate the contract after 
the designer had completed her work under the contract. On 
August 18, 1992, designer filed her Complaint with the trial 
court. Designer complained, among other things, that she had 
substantially performed her part of the agreement and that the 
remaining $2,000.00, plus the additional amounts of Utah State 
Sales tax was due and owing. 
Homeowner filed his Answer and Counterclaim on September 11, 
1992. Homeowner was sent designer's Request for Trial Date on 
January 5, 1993. The trial court sent the Notice of Trial Date 
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on January 12, 1993. Trial was scheduled for February 10, 1993. 
Homeowner filed his Motion for Continuance and various Discovery 
Requests, including his request to depose designer, on January 
15, 1993. The trial court heard the homeowner's motions and 
requests to take depositions on January 27, 1993. 
The trial court granted homeowner's request to take the 
deposition of the designer, and the deposition was scheduled to 
take place on February 5, 1993. Because of designer's stated 
concern that the homeowner was attempting to drive up the cost of 
litigation, the trial court warned the homeowner that if the 
depositions proved to be a bad faith effort to increase the cost 
of litigation, and imposed merely for the purposes of harassment 
and delay, then the costs of those depositions, in accord with 
the provisions of Rule 11 and 26(g) (U.R.C.P.), could be the 
responsibility of the homeowner. The trial court reserved 
consideration and ruling on the issue until the time of trial. 
The trial court denied the homeowner's Motion for Continuance. 
The trial court granted all of homeowner's Discovery 
requests and ordered that all documents, admissions and other 
information requested be provided to the homeowner not later than 
February 3, 1993. All requested matters were produced by the 
designer on or before February 3, 1993. The deposition scheduled 
for February 5, 1993 was then cancelled by the homeowner. 
The trial was held on February 10, 1993. During the Trial, 
the homeowner conceded to the trial court that he owed the Utah 
State sales tax as alleged by the designer, and the homeowner 
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paid the sales tax to the designer. During the proceedings, a 
recess was taken. When the court again resumed the proceedings, 
the tape recorder failed to record the proceedings. When the 
tape starts again, it begins in progress with a witness who is 
identified as Susan St.James, wife of the homeowner. 
The trial court found that the designer had substantially 
performed her obligations under the agreement and entered 
judgment in favor of the designer. 
VII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
HOMEOWNER'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE. 
Homeowner was given more than adequate time to prepare his 
defense and to take discovery. The homeowner cannot show an 
abuse of discretion. The denial of the Motion for Continuance 
was harmless error. This issue is without merit or likelihood of 
success. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENTS TO THE HOMEOWNER REGARDING RULE 
11 SANCTIONS DID NOT PREVENT A FAIR TRIAL. 
The trial court was attempting to educate the pro se 
defendant regarding the Rules of Civil Procedure. A pro se 
defendant is, nevertheless, held to the same standard of conduct 
as one who is licensed to practice law. No objection was raised 
to the remarks and conduct of the trial judge and is therefore 
barred as being raised for the first time on appeal. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The homeowner attempts to unilaterally supplement the 
record, and introduce evidence that is not part of the record on 
appeal. This is in clear violation of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure regarding record supplementation. Because 
the homeowner has not complied with Rule 11 (U.R.A.P.), this 
Court must presume the trial court's decision was correct, valid 
and, supported by the evidence. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
WERE PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Homeowner's statement of the standard of review is 
incorrect. The purported evidence supporting homeowner's 
argument is barred from consideration by virtue of the U.R.A.P. 
11 violation cited above. The trial court's findings of fact are 
supported by the clear weight of the evidence and there is no 
indication from the record that the trial judge failed to 
adequately deliberate and consider the merits of the case. 
Automatic Control Products v. Tel-Tech, 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1989). Designer substantially performed under the agreement and 
is entitled to judgment. 
V. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ACCURATELY 
REFLECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The trial court's findings and conclusions are accurately 
reflected in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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VI, U.R.A.P. 33 SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON HOMEOWNER FOR THE 
BRINGING OF A NON-MERITORIOUS, BAD FAITH APPEAL, 
Homeowner has pursued this appeal even though it has no 
reasonable likelihood of success; has displayed a pattern of 
dilatory practices, which has unreasonably increased the cost of 
this appeal; has failed to exercise reasonable inquiry when 
stating questions of law and standards of review before this 
Court; and has failed to comply with the clear requirements of 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically with respect to 
the attempt to unilaterally supplement the record. Rule 33 
Sanctions are therefore appropriate. 
VII, U.R.A.P. 40(a) SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE HOMEOWNER 
AND HIS ATTORNEY FOR HIS REPEATED FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE RULES 
OF THIS COURT. 
Homeowner's counsel mischaracterizes the proceedings below, 
misstates basic questions of law, attaches unrelated authority, 
and has submitted to this court matters and evidence which are 
not part of the official record. The designer in each case has 
been required to respond to homeowner's violation or non-
compliance with this Court's Rules of Procedure. Rule 40(a) 
Sanctions are therefore appropriate. 
VIII. 
ARGUMENT 
I.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
HOMEOWNER'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE. 
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The Homeowner is required to show an abuse of discretion to 
sustain any merits of his continuance argument on appeal. Hill 
v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992), citing Christenson 
v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988) and Hardv v. Hardy, 
776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989). 
Homeowner's stated reason for urging the continuance of the 
trial date was for the furtherance of discovery. See Transcript 
of Hearing, January 27, 1993, p. 2. Prior to his discovery 
requests of January 15, 1993, the homeowner had performed no 
discovery. The trial court ordered that all discovery requests 
made by the homeowner were to be complied with, no later than 
February 3rd, 1993. See Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 
1993,p.20. All discovery as requested by the homeowner were 
supplied on or before February 3, 1993. All depositions as 
requested by the homeowner were actually scheduled and were to be 
conducted on February 5, 1993. See Transcript of Hearing, 
January 27, 1993, p. 20. The homeowner, after receipt of 
discovery information from the designer, declined to conduct the 
depositions. 
At the hearing on January 27, 1993, the court also offered 
to continue the trial date to February 17, 1993, but the 
homeowner declined that date. See Transcript of Hearing, January 
27, 1993, p. 18. Homeowner had over five months for depositions 
and discovery to be undertaken. It is undisputed that homeowner, 
during that five-month period of time, undertook no formal 
discovery. Homeowner waited until three weeks before the 
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scheduled trial to begin this process by filing requests for 
discovery and depositions on January 15, 1993. The homeowner 
complains that the trial court's denial of his Motion for 
Continuance was unreasonable. The homeowner then fails to show 
even one instance where he was unable to fairly present his case 
because of the denial of the Motion for Continuance. This case 
is a basic collection matter, based upon a written agreement 
prepared in its entirety by the homeowner. The evidence 
presented at trial by both parties consisted of documents and 
statements that were entirely known to both parties. 
The homeowner makes no attempt to show how the denial of his 
Motion for Continuance prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. 
Other than the bald assertion that he did not have time to 
prepare, the homeowner does not even suggest how the trial 
court's denial precluded him from fairly presenting his case. 
Ample time was allowed after the commencement of the lawsuit 
to utilize discovery procedures. It is well established law that 
a trial court is vested with substantial discretion in deciding 
whether requests for continuance should be granted. It is also 
firmly established that the trial courts decision will not be 
reversed unless it is clear that the trial court has abused that 
discretion by acting unreasonably. U.R.C.P. 40(b);Hunt v. Hurst, 
785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990); Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 
1377 (Utah 1988); Hill v. Dickerson,839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 
1992). In Hunt, a pro se party's motion for continuance was 
denied where the pro se party had five months for discovery, 
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prior to submission to the trial com t m IM i» M I i Mimrnat ,f 
Judgment, in 1 dental malpractice action. The facts and 
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The homeowner complains that the trial court did not provide 
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January 27, 1993, p.17-20. The homeowners claims are obviously 
frivolous and without merit. 
The trial court offered homeowner its best choices in trial 
dates available to the court, within the time and resource 
constraints then affecting the trial court. Transcript of 
Hearing, January 27, 1993, p. 21. To assign error to the trial 
court for homeowner's choice is illogical. The travel schedule 
of the homeowner was his choice. The homeowner now contends that 
his choices about that travel schedule should be error assigned 
to the trial court. The trial court scheduled the trial date 
approximately six months from the date after the Complaint was 
filed. The homeowner, by his own statement, was available for 
that trial date, and could not attend a later date because of his 
travel schedule. The homeowner must accept responsibility for 
his scheduling choice. See Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 
1993, ppl8-21. 
Finally, the homeowner claims that a substantial right was 
affected when the trial court denied his Motion for Continuance. 
Homeowner offers no reason why the five months prior to trial was 
not an ample length of time to prepare his defense. The only 
claim that homeowner forwards on this matter is, that this Court 
should upset the trial court's ruling because the trial court 
would not accommodate homeowner's travel schedule. See 
Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 1993, ppl8-21. This does not 
amount to a showing of an abuse of discretion. 
This claim of error is without merit, it has no reasonable 
17 
1 Lkelihood of success and Is entirely tiivoJou. n \ Tiar ict^i 
II. THE TRIAL COIJK i ^ ^rAi'EMENTS TO THE HOMEOWNER REGARDING RULa 
11 AND RULE 26(g) SANCTIONS WERE REASONABLE AND PROPER AND L-iD NOT 
PREVENT A FAIR TRIAL. 
It Is well estab 11 shed 11 iat 11 Ie pei: n i:I ssI vei iess i Ised for di scovery 
procedures has limitations, 5ir:d Piat these . iu\± i.at, ions dio^ . J 
:-. • " - jf tne rules ^f "ivi. Procedure v::ic: 
are * ecure tne just, speedy, -r.^ c^. . . 
deter minat i or ,: even- accicr:. " State Road Commission v. Pettv, 
J LJ t\~cl '-11.4 i Ul. .ill I''Mi i Th'-' M i l l i-riirt has the power and 
discretion to Impose sanctions on parties who frustrate ttno 
• hi eot ive . Under Ru] r- 1 1 and 2 6(g) II. P , A. P . a party signing 
motions, documents , ana - .• i_ i i * - t «11 O C U V W L ; requt-;;:" i w i v I I i i \ by that 
signature that those requests are interposed in good faith The 
i v I-i I nidge i in"' present case was merely trying to encourage 
such an outcome Ly his explanations ot i. Ii^by i u P-, P P, i L 
Procedure to the pro se defendant. 
i in- c'.ipp.n.ipi J 'it i Paraor P V PvitPon of the trial court's 
statements regarding homeowner ' o decision to depose I K- dt-^ig.-r 
are clear from, the Transcript of Hearing nn January 27, P P . 
See Transcript • 1 'i-?,;ir Jin, i JJA.I , "' • »' , P P P-17 
Simply stated, the trial court was attempting to explain lu a iz o 
se £ • a 3 : t:y the reqi i i rements of good faith and the possible 
imposition of Rule 11 and Kile ^ o p i i i i -ITM I inn,^ in ill 
participants In the litigation in the event that the court
 WC1K, 
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convinced of the bad faith of any of the parties. The court 
explained that either party is subject to sanctions, including 
costs and attorney's fees, if they act in bad faith toward each 
other and needlessly increase the cost of litigation to the 
opposing party. The following language of the Court illustrates 
the Court's indulgence of the homeowner, and the court's attempt 
to explain the basic legal precept of good faith requirements to 
the homeowner: 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to award you 
attorney's fees if you didn't incur any, number one. 
You've chosen to be pro se. If in the course of a 
trial you were to convince me that this action was 
brought in bad faith, without any legitimate basis, 
that if your costs were — if Mr. Gold required you to 
take depositions and do things that were simply a waste 
of time and running up costs, then absolutely, I would 
consider a motion to award fees back. 
But that's not what I have before me. I have a 
plaintiff that brought an action. There was no 
ostensible reason why a deposition should be taken in 
the case. And if that proves to be correct, that there 
was no needful, appropriate reason for the deposition, 
I'm just telling you you're on the hook for the costs 
of those. 
If Mr. Gold required something for you to do that 
incurred a cost that was not needful, it was merely for 
harass, delay, then absolutely you're going to be 
looking—you' d be entitled to some sanctions back to 
him. The rules apply both ways. 
Judge Roger Livingston, Trial Court Judge, Transcript of Hearing, 
January 27, 1993, pp. 16-17. 
Rule 26(g) (U.R.C.P.) specifically provides that a court, 
upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose appropriate 
sanction, including reasonable expenses incurred, upon a party 
whose discovery certification is made in violation of the rule. 
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Rale 'Abi:^ sp^::. :.*-=.: 1 laxtn and 
reasonable inquiry certification apply. hint ine party's 
i ••;•.•"-,.-.-; . "• • - * i) consistent with these 
rules and warrantee ty existing - aw or a go.'; , _, n 
the extension modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed t ; _-•;:., - purpose, rmch a.s to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay r needles increase -n tne -r isr. 
ilid IIUL unreasonable* ^z ur iuiy burdensome r 
expensive, given :e need. _ ^ --• i 
i n the case, the amount . n ronrrcversy, and toe :np*_i ia:,c-= ,i * :.e 
: ssues .i  »l ii i' rjr:on. " f\Uj.e .?f (T' '\ -.* . . 
The statements of ..c ' nal court "^ . . i-... J 
the specific qooi ^ , - - • *nd reasonable in: ::r, requirement _i 
.Rule JbUj) nii>i huh- I J i ii. J' ' , "F"h'":j homeowner does not 
complain or allege that the statements of the judge ait- in any 
1
 My incorrect or improper in light: of Rule 26(g), That. 
allegation cannot be made l^ t Jjt-» homeowner )>WVUM,P -Tndqe 
Livingston's statements are a correct and precise statement of a 
rail, ".< respc nsib;i i 11 to induct discovery in good faith. 
The homeowner characterizes the issue oL lernar ks and I'IIINI i 
:»f the trial judge as that of an exclusive question of law. To 
1
 -
lj {
'"
; H
'
Ll
 -1» I " l ( ,-»5 Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.,7 52 P.2d 884 (Utah 19SH\ See Appellant *& -----
linkage and attribution of authority in this argumenc defies 
logic. The question present <-d ;. nh. . >f I hf- iippi -rriaoeness of 
the remarks and conduct of the trial judge. That issue is in no 
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way related to the decision reached in Mountain Fuel, Mountain 
Fuel establishes a standard of review where questions of law 
regarding equal protection are exclusively raised on appeal. The 
homeowner's citation of authority and characterization of the 
questions of law presented are clearly inappropriate. 
A pro se defendant is held to the same standard of conduct 
as one who is licensed to practice law. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
p.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983), reaffirmed by Worst v. Department of 
Employment Security, 818 p.2d 1036, note 3 (Utah App. 1991). 
However, under the doctrine that a lay person acting as his or 
her own attorney should be accorded every consideration that may 
reasonably be indulged, the trial court, in the present case, 
undertook to explain the implications of unnecessarily increasing 
the cost of litigation to the designer. After indulging the pro 
se defendant in a lengthy explanation of the rules of the court, 
the trial court waived the U.R.C.P. requirement for discovery at 
least 3 0 days before trial and granted the homeowner's Motion for 
Discovery. It is impossible for the designer to guess at how 
this indulgence by the court "precluded" the homeowner from 
taking the requested depositions. 
Alternatively, even if the trial court erred in its 
explanations of the rules to the homeowner, there was no 
objection raised by homeowner to the remarks and conduct of the 
trial judge. This Court will not address an issue raised for the 
first time on appeal. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lvtle, 
806 P.2d 239, 242 (Utah App. 1991). See also: Gaston v. Hunter, 
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588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App 1 <7"i ">ntJr wn i ^ - , In - i i']lil Mi -ippeal 
in instance of judicial misconduct if he fails to object at i 
time when ctlM-'itM "n i =c^  iMui t ,
 u| I hp ^iired); First Realty & Inv, 
Co . , Inc . v . Fubert, 60 0 P. 2d 114J* (I da no i < ( '•
 ( ..riei nei i L IJI. 
court :^rr"^rv 'v commented from bencn was n jt preserved f-o 
appeal ..* -i- . i-'~ — - ' " hurt's 
remark : il-Co Feeds, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank m r^vr-
i: ^>cw '.^ r--- •" * ^ or preserve for appeal issue 
oi JUCIIC — CIJL iiiisccnouci ~ _ _ *^ -^*' t 
""olcani^ anopr" at off-record bench conference, where party did 
n o . > ' it 11 t i i. M 
Homeowner next argues that because pro se defendant 
disagreed with the trial court's ruling, that: he thereby served 
disagreement does non rise TO tn^ I eve. -. <.u. OJ';C::J. * 
/ •:* - -^Zziir -' i'M ~ ~ "-• thereon, Bar son v. Squibb, M 3 2 
. , _ i - 3^ , * nctid che 
standard as follows: 
li i order to preserve a contention of error on appeal, 
the party claiming the error in admission of evidence 
must raise the objection to the trial court in clear 
and concise terms and in a timely fashion calculated to 
obtain a ruling thereon. 
The pro se defendant's disagreements do not u,;»y i u M u s 
level of contention so as to allow the trial court to rule. 
Transcript oi Hearing, Janu.iM ' '- " 'l| - M '"' " ' ' imply 
engaging in argument with the trial judge does not calculate an 
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opportunity for a ruling. The issue is therefore barred, as 
being raised for the first time on appeal. 
This issue of appeal has no reasonable likelihood of 
success, is trivial to the disposition of the case, is entirely 
frivolous in its nature, and is not based on the facts 
surrounding the indulgence of the pro se party by the trial 
court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY 
THE HOMEOWNER. 
Homeowner admits in his Brief (pl3), and elsewhere (Memo, in 
Opposition to Appellees Motion to Strike and for Sanctions, 
January 21, 1994), that there is no record of the trial court 
excluding any evidence where homeowner purportedly attempted to 
introduce documentary evidence. The homeowner then attempts to 
supplement the record by attaching a purported exhibit and the 
Affidavit of Susan St. James. Appendix F & G, Appellant 's Brief. 
Homeowner's attempt to unilaterally supplement the record in 
this manner is patently improper and must be disregarded because 
homeowner has failed to comply with Rule 11(g)&(h)U.R.A.P.. His 
claim is therefore fatally deficient under Rule 11(e)(2) 
U.R.A.P. The proper method for supplementing the record is for 
homeowner to seek a supplementation hearing before the trial 
court. Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App. 
1991) (when record appropriately needs supplementation, Rule 
11(h) is method to be implemented). This Court has further 
announced its view on claims of error submitted outside the scope 
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ot U. R.A.I , 1.1 !i , ' M ,,„ Hjrton '. Uern State Mutual of Utah: 
Absent the trial transcript, appellant's claim of error 
is "merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which 
we cannot resolve." Mark VII Fin. Consultants Co., 792 
P.2d at 134. Without all the relevant evidence bearing 
on the issues raised on appeal, as required by Utah 
R.App.P. 11(E)(2), "we can only presume that the 
judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. State 
v. Nine "Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars 7^1 
7 2i r^" 217 (Utah App. 1990), 
7 94 P. 2d 847 f
 fi 1', ,i 
•- affidavit and -vidence -attached as appendix to 
homeowner's B u e t Jcinm -.- ... . I-y Mil, < v>urt. Olson at 
1359-60. 
Eecausp I he homeowner has not complied with Rule 11 U.R.A.P. 
this Court must presume that Lhe i i J jl »i" I k-" i . PHI . i? 
correct and valid and that it was supported by the evidence. 
State v . Raw i i JI j ^^ p ,M 1'"0 (Utah App. 1992) (absent adequate 
record, court could nut address issues icutea mi >\> ui i pi^sume 
correctness of disposition made by trial court:1 l.son v. 
Richins, ' M I ,I 1 «L in! ill .'i i ! - i i he Court cf Appeals will 
presume that the trial court's findings were supported Ly 
competent an* I sufficient evidence, where entire record was not 
before Court j ; Smith v. /uicich, b^n i , 2d " • 1 . ir i i '^ C i twhere 
record before Supreme Court, is incomplete, M is unable to review 
-::i must therefore presume that verdict was 
supported by admissible and competent «;Vidence)f t n ot Federal 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984) dr 'he 
absence of -J J en i 1, -upreme ""-Mirt rrnifit presume that the trial 
court's rulings were correct); Sevan v. J.H. Construction .'u.. 
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Inc., 669 P.2d 441 (Utah 1983) (in the absence of a transcript 
Court assumes that the proceedings at trial were regular and 
proper and that the judgment was supported by competent and 
sufficient evidence). 
Any reasonable inquiry into the rules of this Court and, the 
fundamental rules of law governing record supplementation, would 
have obviated homeowner's argument and designer's cost in 
responding. It is clear that this argument of homeowner is 
without merit and has been improperly interposed upon this Court. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this issue is properly before this 
court, there can be no showing of error. The standard of review 
related to a trial court's determination of admissibility of 
evidence is that the trial court's ruling will not be upset 
absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 
(Utah App. 1993) . The record clearly shows that the trial court 
openly invited the.homeowner on numerous occasions to submit 
further evidence and testimony. None was forthcoming from the 
homeowner. The Court generously allowed the homeowner free and 
full range in submission of evidence and argument. A finding of 
abuse of discretion cannot be supported in this matter. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
WERE PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review applicable to the issue raised by 
homeowner is again different than the standard posited by the 
homeowner. The issue of the contract involves both a question of 
fact and a question of law for the purposes of review. Findings 
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ci ~ac: .  . _ - : '' •""•'•• frrrneous; 
findings of law wi . :e reviewea for cctieuincoi. na^co c-.. /i^es 
Corporation •/. Ben; T . -*1 7.2: -6.?9 r!t:an 19°, : t :ng • ah 
Rule of Civ, Procedure -_ ~ a. • State reters^:. 
425 (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) ; £ . jte v. Ramirez, fil"7 ?.?] 7"i, <ii-rJ - "an 
I " * '.J1 i , 
Homeowner first argues that because, 
allow his "documentary evidence" :\ substantial performance 
discusser .;. h^ci i - .at the trial coun 
erred in its Findings of Fact. 
T - >-liancp upon homeowner's objection to the trial 
cour*" ^ "reiuodl \^ JU:L . i-_--.•- - -**' "- > ^ n 
defeating. Homeowner cannot avail mmse. : v: *ne •:.ai . -: a 
: . • dence where tv,OGe proceedings -.re not 
part :r the record he presents ^n appea~ 
fail"" " *" =**• t-^pt- n-4\- proper record supplementation . accc: i with 
I: he kuitis i i J ,\ppe i I a t • •' Frocpdu \ «j, Homeowner * s on ly cont ent ion 
with the Findings of Fact is summarily whisked away when ii^  n 
lonaer has the purported "non-admission of documentary evidence" 
io complain ot . lie c inn<.»l pui:-.Uf his < "b • m in l his GVurt , 
because it is simply not part of the record as required m Rul-1 
I I I i 1 ! P \ , p . . 
Al J relevant aspects cr m e (MIKJ-UJI ucept m e, 
consideration, performance, etc.) were explored by the trial 
court thr^uqln I <j I m m o J11I* J u • I exhibits and extensive 
colloqu^ between the court and the witnesses. See Transaipt: of 
2 6 
Trial, pp. 1-91. 
Homeowner now questions the trial court's findings and cites 
Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 1988), as 
authoritative. Of course, the standard of review cited in Baker 
applies where the court interprets a contract as a matter of law 
without regard for extrinsic evidence. It cannot be seriously 
argued that the trial court in the present case did not have a 
deep and probing regard for extrinsic evidence related to the 
contract. This much is patently clear from the entire record. 
The trial court in this matter admitted and allowed evidence 
which went far beyond the "four corners" of the August 14, 1991 
agreement. See Trial Transcript, February 5, 1993, pp30-66. 
That evidence is extrinsic in nature. The standard of review 
urged by the homeowner does not address the existence of such 
extrinsic evidence. 
Homeowner's only objection to the Findings of Fact 
deals with Paragraph 9 of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. See Discussion of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, March 17, 1993, p. 14 (hereinafter 
"Discussion"). Paragraph 9 reads as follows: 
9. The contract between plaintiff and defendant 
provided that plaintiff would be paid a design fee in 
the amount of $8,000.00 for her services, and that said 
design fee would be paid by way of $2,000.00 quarterly 
payments with the first payment being due on September 
30, 1991. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, March 17, 1993, p. 3. 
The trial court found, by a preponderance of evidence, that 
the contract provided for said payment. There is nothing 
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whatever in the record to suggest that the trial court's finding 
is clearly erroneous. Any claim that the homeowner makes in this 
regard is simply his continuing difference of opinion with the 
trial court's finding which is adverse to him. See Discussion, 
pp. 7, 10-11. The disagreement with the trial court on this 
matter does not constitute a meritorious claim of a "clearly 
erroneous" finding. There is ample testimony to justify such a 
finding, and the homeowner never has denied that he exclusively 
prepared the agreement. 
More importantly, the homeowner never objects or questions 
the trial court's Finding of Fact, paragraph 12, where the trial 
court finds substantial performance on the part of the designer. 
The issue of termination on his part is rendered moot by 
designer's successful assertion of her "substantial performance" 
claim. Again, the evidence submitted to the court, and the 
record provides clear justification for such a finding of 
substantial performance by the designer. The "clearly erroneous" 
standard cannot be met. 
V. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ACCURATELY 
REFLECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact will not be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Kasco Services Corporation v. 
Benson, op.cit. infra, and where it appears that the trial judge 
adequately deliberated and considered the merits of the case in 
entering its findings and judgement, Automatic Control Products 
v. Tel-Tech,780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989). 
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Homeowner ignores the extensive statements of the trial 
court on this matter, at the time of trial, and further ignores 
the extensive discussion of-the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which took place before the trial court on March 17, 1993. 
The homeowner objected to a number of the Findings of Fact 
at the Discussion on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
held on March 17, 1993 ("Discussion"). The homeowner apparently 
believes that his differences of opinion with the trial court are 
grounds for the reversal of the trial court's specific order. 
The trial court spent a generous amount of time hearing the 
objections of the homeowner on the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The homeowner would have this Court re-hash 
the issue simply because he does not agree that the court knew 
what it signed on the 17th of March, 1993. This is patently 
absurd. If there is any question that the trial court 
"mechanically" adopted the designer's proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it is dispelled by an examination of the 
changes made in the final, amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which contain changes that were urged by the 
homeowner. See Discussion, p2,3,4,5,10,12,13 . The trial court 
also made it's position clear during the Discussion: 
THE COURT: . . . Again, I guess this is what 
trials are for, to sort out contesting perspectives and 
different points of view. Again, I tried to do the 
best I can for that and so the--and I do believe that 
the judgement, the, form and Findings of Fact as I've 
directed those be changed, accurately reflect those. 
Again, it's not as either of you would have them but I 
believe the findings and conclusions and judgement form 
is consistent with the ruling of the Court. And I have 
no problem with any of that. 
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Discussion, p.15. 
The trial court signed the amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law only one hour later. It is hard to imagine 
where the homeowner can find the error he seeks. Assuming, 
arguendo, that homeowner properly defines the question of law, 
standard of review, and cites the correct authority, he is still 
a long way from proving the Findings are against the "clear 
weight of the evidence". 
VI. U.R.A.P. 33 SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON HOMEOWNER FOR THE 
BRINGING OF A NON-MERITORIOUS, BAD FAITH APPEAL, 
Homeowner has pursued this appeal even though it has no 
reasonable likelihood of success, continued to display a pattern 
of dilatory practices and has failed to exercise reasonable 
inquiry when stating questions of law and standards of review 
before this Court. 
Designer maintains that the issues brought before this Court 
are without merit and are pursued as a dilatory tactic to avoid 
final judgment. Homeowner brings a case to this Court which 
cannot be reasonably expected to succeed. 
Homeowner has established a pattern of improper docketing 
statements, improper submission of documents, failure to adhere 
to rules of appellate procedure and a consistent misapplication 
or lack of authority in his memoranda. Designer has been 
obligated to respond to four docketing statements, improperly 
interposed affidavits and exhibits, numerous procedural missteps 
and more than mild deficiencies in presenting his issues on 
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appeal. Reasonable inquiry into the status of Homeowner's claim, 
the rules of this court and the current state of the law 
governing homeowner's issues raised on appeal would have 
dispensed with such improprieties. 
This is precisely the type and kind of case which has been 
previously held out by this Court as ripe for Rule 33 Sanctions 
and Award of Costs. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 1987); 
Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990); Utah Deot. of Social 
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1987); Mauahan v. 
Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). 
VII. U.R.A.P. 40(a) SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE HOMEOWNER 
AND HIS ATTORNEY FOR HIS REPEATED FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE RULES 
OF THIS COURT. 
Homeowner's counsel mischaracterizes the proceedings below, 
misstates basic questions of law, attaches unrelated authority, 
and fumbles basic standards of appellate review. This type of 
preparation is indicated by the four different docketing 
statements filed in connection with this case. 
A great deal of time must be expended in properly re-stating 
the questions of law, standards of review and, proceedings in the 
lower court. Additionally, when there are elementary flaws in 
the docketing statement, designer is forced to expend inordinate 
time and resources to bring these matters to this Court's 
attention. 
This appeal has previously been dismissed by the Court 
because of inadequate Docketing Statements filed by the homeowner 
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and his attorneys. The designer has previously filed Objections 
to homeowner's prior Docketing Statements, and a Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal, all of which have been previously granted by this 
Court. The homeowner and his current legal counsel have 
misrepresented the homeowner's prior representation by a licensed 
and active member of the Utah State Bar in order to obtain the 
reinstatement of this appeal. Those misrepresentations have been 
verified by affidavits on file with this Court from both the 
homeowner's personal secretary and the record keeping personnel 
from the Utah State Bar. 
Rule 40(a) sanctions are, therefore, appropriate in this 
case. The most recent impropriety in homeowner's conduct is the 
attempt to accomplish record supplementation in violation of Rule 
ll(g)&(h) and Rule 11(3) (2) (U.R.A.P.). Even a cursory review of 
this Court's Rules of Procedure and the recent case law related 
to record supplementation would have resulted in significant 
savings of time and expense to designer in responding to this 
improper, unmeritorious and frivolous attempt to supplement. 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, homeowner's appeal should 
be denied. The trial court acted properly, within its 
discretion, and conducted a fair and impartial hearing and trial. 
The designer substantially performed her services under the 
agreement and is entitled to the agreed compensation. 
The homeowner has brought this appeal to delay final 
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judgment in the order of paying the designer. It was his intent 
from the outset to rob designer of her fee by so increasing the 
cost of collection that it grossly exceeded the amount in 
controversy. Additionally, homeowner and his various attorneys 
have interposed bad faith arguments, exhibits and other papers on 
this court and they should be additionally sanctioned for such 
violations of this court's rules. 
The judgement of the trial court should be affirmed and this 
court should award designer her attorney fees and double costs or. 
appeal. 
DATED this J day of February, 1994. 
"»S .^.fl-4-Afl 
Brent A. Gold 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
There are no addendums that appellee wishes to add to her brief. 
However, please note that Appellant's Brief contains relevant 
materials that are the subject of Appellee's Brief, and a 
reproduction here is regarded as wasteful. 
Appellant's Brief Addendums 
Addendum A 
Addendum B 
Addendum C 
Addendum D 
Addendum E 
Addendum F 
Addendum G 
Addendum H 
The Contract 
Notice of Appeal 
Judgement 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Homeowner's Motion for Continuance 
Affidavit of Susan St. James 
Excluded Evidence 
Discussion of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, March 17, 1993 
Addendum I: Transcript of Hearing, January 27, 1993 
Addendum J: Portion of Trial Transcript, February 10, 1993 
